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5
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA. 7
ACCRETION. See Riparian Owner.
ACTION.
Assumption of Mortgage by Purchaser of Land-Statute of Frauds,
-A. made three successive mortgages of his realty to B., C., and D.
He then sold this realty to E., describing the mortgages in his deed of
conveyance and adding the words, "which said mortgages are hereby
assumed by E., as part of the consideration of this deed." Subse-
quently B., the first mortgagee, sold the realty under the powers of his
mortgage. D., the third mortgagee, then brought assumpsit against E.,
the purchaser from A., for the amount of A.'s mortgage-note to D.:
Rehd, that E. was liable for the amount of the note: Urquhart v. Bray-
ton, 12 R. I.
E.'s liability was under an implied contract, and hence not subject to
the Statute of Frauds: Id.
E.'s liability, not arising from a sealed contract, might be enforced
by assumpsit: Id.
ADMIRALTY.
Collston- Warrant to Arrest Mail Packet belonging to Foreign State
- Treaty.making Power of Crown-Jurisdiction.-A packet conveying
mails and carrying on commerce, does not, notwithstanding that she
belongs to the sovereign of a foreign state, and is officered by officers
commissioned by him, come within the category of vessels which are
exempt from process of law; and it is not competent to the Crown,
without the authority of Parliament, to clothe such a vessel with the
immunity of a foreign ship of war, so as to deprive a British subject of
his right to proceed against her: The Parlement Beige, L. R., 4 Prob.
Div.
Salvage-Towage Contract-Counter Claim.-A tug under contract
Selected from recent numbers of the Law Reports.
2 From Hou. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 89 Ills. Reports.
s From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 68 Mo. Reports.
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his reports.
5 Cases.decided during the present term and to be reported in 7 or 8 Oregon
Reports.
s From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 12 R. I. Reports.
7 From Hon. Robert White, Reporter, to appear in 14 W. Va. Reports.
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to tow a ship is not entitled to salvage remuneration for rescuing the
ship from danger brought about by the tug's negligent perfbrmance of
her towage contract. A tug agreed to tow a ship from Liverpool round
the Skerries for a fixed sum. The tug imprudently towed the ship in
bad weather too near a lee shore, and the weather becoming worse dur-
ing the performance of the agreed towage service, the hawser parted,
and the ship was placed in a position of danger, and was compelled to
let go her anchors to avoid being driven on shore. From this position
she was rescued by the tug, having been compelled to slip her anchors
and chains, which were lost: Held, that the tug was not entitled to
claim salvage remuneration, and that her owners were liable to pay for
the loss of the anchors and chains : The Robert Dixon, L. R., 4 Prob.
Div.
AGENT.
Payments made to when Good.-Payments made to an agent are
good and obligatory upon the principal in all cases where the agent is
authorized to receive payment, either by express authority, from the
usage of trade, or from the particular dealings between the parties:
Noble v. Nugent, 89 Ills.
AssuMtPsIT. See Action.
ATTORNEY.
Actionfor Fees.-Counsel fees cannot be recovered by action, unless
a contract fixing the amount can be shown : Hopper v. Ludlum, 12
Vroom.
BAILMENT.
Pledge.-A. endorsed a note made by W. and delivered it to W. to
raise funds on. W. pledged it to P. for a debt due, which was after-
wards paid. W., owing another debt to P., wrote to P., while the note
formerly pledged was still in P.'s hands, that W. had arranged with
his creditors for a time and wished the debt due to P. carried for a while,
P. to hold as collateral as before the note endorsed by A. A. was
secured for his endorsement. In an action by P. against A. the in-
dorser: Held, that the letter of W. to P. implied an actual pledge, and
was not a mere offer to pledge. field, further, that P. could recover:
Providence Thread Co. v. Aldrich, 12 R. I.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Partnership.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See Debtor and Creditor.
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Drainage of Low Lands-Ancient Usage.-The legislative right to
order lcw lands to be drained, at the expense of the owners, rests
entirely jn ancient custom, and cannot be deduced from the power to
legislate, unless in the particular case, the lands are so situated or con.
ditioned !s to make their reclamation a matter of direct public con
cern: Hoagland v. Wurts, 12 Vroom.
In this state ancient usage sanctions legislation that provides for the
drainage of low lands at the expense of the owners. But such legisla-
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tion, to be valid, must conform to the usage upon which the right to
legislate is founded : Id.
A law authorized the cost of a drainage scheme to be estimated, and
such estimated expense to be allotted to the landowner in proportion
fixed by the mere judgment of the appraisers, in advance of the doing
of the work. Held, that such a method was a departure from the old
usage, and was illegal: Id.
CONTRACT. See Sale.
Entire or Divisible.-A contract to cut and deliver at the boom of
appellant's mill, one million feet of good, sound merchantable logs
within the year, at $.25 per thousand feet, to be scaled and received as
each one hundred thousand feet are put in floating water of the creek,
held to be a severable and not an entire contract: Tenny et al. v. Mul-
vaney et al., S. C., Oregon.
Parties Contracting by Letter.-The defendant applied for shares in
the plaintiffs' company. The company allotted the shares to the defend-
ant, and duly addressed to him and posted a letter containing the notice
of allotment, bnt the letter never was received by him. Held, by BAG-
GALLAY and THESIGER, L.JJ., BRAMWELL, L. J., dissenting, that the
defendant was a shareholder: British and American Telegraph Co. v.
Colson, Law Rep., 6 Ex. 18, overruled: Household Fire Ins. Co. v.
Grant, Law Rep. 4 Exch. Div.
CORPORATION. See Criminal Law.
Estoppel.-Stockholders who subscribe and organize a corporation
under a charter, and reap the benefits of the law, and thereby induce
persons to credit the corporation, or make deposits on the faith of
its being legally organized, and of the individual liability of its mem-
bers, will be estopped from alleging that the charter is unconstitutional
as a means of avoiding their personal liability as fixed by such charter:
McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 Ills.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Verdict.
Libel-Indictment. -Whether matter published is obscene or not is 6
question of law and not of fact, and an indictment for printing, having
in possession and giving away an obscene and indecent pamphlet, masst
set out the supposed obscene matter, unless the publication is in the
hands of the defendant, or out of the power of the prosecution, or the
matter is too gross and obscene to be spread on the records of the
court, either of which facts, if existing, should be averred as an excuse
for failing to set out the obscene matters: Mc.Nair v. The People,
89 Ills.
Corporation-Indictment of.-A corporation may be indicted for
"Sabbath breaking" under the 16th and 17th sections of chapter 149
of the Code of W. Va. : State v. B. & 0. Railroad Co., 14 W. Va.
Murder.-Section 1, p. 445 Wagner's Statutes, provides that every
murder * * * which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall )
be deemed murder in the first degree. Held, that the words "other
felony" here refer to some felony collateral to the homicide, and not to
those acts of personal violence to the deceased which are necessary and
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constituent elements of the homicide itself. They are inerged in it,
and do not, when consummated, constitute an offence distinct from the
homicide. Section 33 p. 450, Wag. Stat., makes them a felony only
when death does not ensue. Hence, where a homicide results from
blows given wilfully and maliciously, and with intent to inflict great
bodily harm, but without the intent to kill, it does not constitute murder
in the first degree. NORTON, J., and SHERWOOD, C. J., dissenting:
State v. Shock, 68 Mo.
DAMAGES.
Liquidated by the Partie, in Advance.-Where in a written contract,
to cut a certain number of cords of wood by a given time, it was stipit.
lated in the contract that in case the wood was not all cut by the time
named in the contract, the laborer should forfeit five cents per cord on
what wood he had cut. Held, that such stipulation fixes tile measure
of damages to be paid by the party failing to cut the wood: Lun
Louis v. Brown, S. C., Oregon.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Taking Separate Obligation for Joint Debt.-Where there is an
express agreement between the creditor and a partnership or a joint
debtor, whereby the creditor agrees to take and accepts the individual
note or obligation of the partner or joint debtor in discharge of the
partnership or joint debt, such agreement is founded upon a valid con-
sideration, and will have the effect to discharge the partnership or joint
debt: Bowyer v. Martin, 14 W. Va.
Such an agreement and acceptance would be equally binding if it
were to take the individual obligations or notes of each partner or joint
debtor, each for his portion of the joint or partnership debt, and would
release the individuals from the joint or partnership debt: Id.
Mortgage of Chattels&-Possession and Power of Sale remaining in
Mortgagor.-Where it appears either on the face of the mortgage or by
parol evidence that the mortgagee of personal property has given to the
mortgagor an unlimited power to dispose of the property mortgaged for
the use of the mortgagor, and the property remains in the hands of the
mortgagor, the mortgage is void as to purchasers and attaching cred-
itors of the mortgagor : Orton v. Orton, S. C., Oregon.
DRAINAGE. See Constitutional Law.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Choice by Public-Mfine.-When lands are sought to be taken fr a
public use, the public authorities, in the absence of any statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, have a reasonable time given them, after the
ascertainment of the expense of the scheme, to decide whether to accept
or refuse the land at the price fixed: O'lNeilt v. Freeholders of the
Caunty of Hudson, 12 Vroom.
Commissioners duly appointed by force of a special statute, having
reported a valuation of certain lands intended to be added to the
premises connected with the county jail, &c., and a motion being made
at a meeting of the board of freeholders to accept such lands at the
price thus fixed, and such motion being rejected, held, that such vote
VoL. XXVII.-92
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was a rejection of the scheme, and was a finality, and that the power
given by the act was exhausted : Id.
EVIDENCE.
Laws of Foreign Country-Interpretation of Writings.-Courts do not
take judicial notice of the laws of a foreign country, but they must be
proved as facts. The unwritten law of a foreign country must be shown
by the oral testimony of witnesses skilled therein, and the published
reports of the decisions of such country: State v. Lung Louis, S. C.,
Oregon.
The construction and legal effect of a written agreement, when intro-
duced in evidence, i'I a question of law for the court, and should not be
left to the determination of the.jury : Id.
EXECUTION
Money in Oustodia Legis.-Money in the hands of the sheriff col-
lected on execution is in custodia legis, and is not subject to levy on a
subsequent execution against the plaintiff in the first: The State ez. tel.
Kansas Gity National Bank V. Boothe, 68 Mo.
Personal property of W. was seized under an attachment, and being
of a perishable nature, was sold by the sheriff and the proceeds deposited
in a bank on his general account. The attachment was afterwards dis-
solved, and an execution issued for the amount of the debt, which was
delivered to the sheriff with directions to levy the same on the money in
his hands: Held, that the money so held by the sheriff could not be
seized on execution: Id.
FOREIGN LAW. See Evidence.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Action; Specific Performance.
GUARANTY.
For Rent-Meaning of" Occpy."-B. signed an agreement by which
he guaranteed the payment of M.'s rent "so long as said M. shall
occupy said premises." Held, that the word "occupy" denoted the
whole period of tenancy: Morrow v. Brady, 12 R. I.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Sale of Wife's 6'oods by Husband.-Where a husband takes the per-
sonal property of his wife and sells the same to a third person, and she
is not present at the sale, or afforded an opportunity to give notice of
her rights, and has made no sale to her husband, or delivery to him
under any contract of sale, she will not be estopped from asserting her
title as against the purchaser, though he had no notice of her title. A
vendor usually cannot transfer any better or greater title than he him-
self holds: Klein v. Seibold, 89 Ills.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See Admiralty.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Notmce to Qut.-The defendant was tenant to the plaintiff from year
t.o year of a shop and premises: the plaintiff gave the defendant notice
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in writing to quit on a day terminating the tenancy. The notice con-
tained the following clause: "And I hereby further give you notice
that should you retain possession of the premises after the day before
mentioned the annual rental of the premises now held by you from me
will be 1601., payable quarterly, in advance." Held, by BRA-WELL
and COTTON, LJJ., BRETT, L. J., dissenting, that the notice to quit
being otherwise sufficient, it was not rendered invalid by the additional
clause: Ahearn v. Bellman, Law Rep., 4 Exch. Div.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence.
MORTGAGE. See Action; Debtor and Creditor; Receiver.
Notice of an Unrecorded Mortgae.-Any fact or circumstance that
tends to give notice or informs a party that there is an encumbrance
upon land, is sufficient to charge him with notice of its existence.
And where an administrator's deed, under which the purchaser claimed,
recited a decree which required a mortgage to be given, and that the
purchaser had complied with the decree, this is sufficient notice to any
one dealing with such purchaser of the existence of an unrecorded
mortgage given by such purchaser: .Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ford, 89
Ills.
Parties.-A bill to foreclose a mortgage should be brought in the
name of the equitable owner of the notes, and not in the name of the
payee for his use, but the objection that it is brought in the payee's
name should be urged in the court below to afford an opportunity
to obviate by amendment: Irish v. Sharp, 89 Ills.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
A municipal corporation will not be allowed to purchase realty in
order by controling it to compel a taxpayer to abandon or compromise
his litigation with the municipality: Place v. City of Providence,
12 R. I.
City Ordinance may be shown to be Unreasonabe.-A city ordinance
is not conclusive, but may be shown to be unreasonable. In a suit on a
special tax bill for the building of a sidewalk, evidence is admissible to
show that the ordinance authorizing its construction was unnecessary
and oppressive-it being located in an uninhabited portion of the city
and disconnected with any other street or sidewalk: Carrigan v. Gage
68 Mo.
Debts of Execution against.-A writ of fierifacias may issue, under
the code of West Virginia, against a political public municipal corpo-
ration, upon a judgment for a debt or damages rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction: Brown v. Gates, 14 W. Va.
But by implication the taxes and public revenues of such corporations
are exempt: Id.
It seems that such a corporation may sometimes own some descrip.
tions of property strictly private, or interests in such property, or have
debts of a strictly private nature due to it which are subject to levy
and to the lien of such writ of fierifacias. But perhaps property
charged with public trusts, or owned or used by such corporation for
pablic purposes, such as fire-engines, &c., are not subject to levy or to
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the lien of a fieri facias, upon the same principle that the taxes and
revenues of such corporation are not subject to the levy or lien of aficri
facias, but as that question is not involved in this case it is not now
decided: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Nlew Trial; Railroad.
Mirster and Servant-Defective Mahinehry.-In an action brought by
a workman against the corporation which employed him, to recover
compensation for injuries which the plaintiff alleged were caused by the
negligence of the defendant in not keeping in proper repair certain
machinery operated by the plaintiff, in not keeping this machinery
properly protected and boxed, and in not keeping the room in which
this machinery was placed, properly lighted, it appeared that the plain-
tiff was a man of mature years and ordinary intelligence, and had
worked at the machinery in question for four years; that the room was
lighted as usual; that he had operated the machinery for weeks in its
imperfect state without protest or complaint; and that no statute in
Rhode Island required such machinery to be boxed: Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover: Kdly v. Silver Spring Company, 12 R. I.
Held, further, that one voluntarily entering a dangerous service,
knowing the danger, himself assumes the risk of his employment: Id.
Held, further, that one continuing to work exposed to a known dan-
ger, without complaint, without any promise that the danger shall be
removed, and not under stress of special exigency, consents to the risk
of his employment; Id.
Use of .Noxious Gas-Injury to Plants.-Plants in the plaintiff's
green-house connected with the public sewers, were injured by illu-
minating gas which escaped from the mains of the Gas Company, the
defendant, into the sewers, and thence found its way to the green-
houses. It appeared that when the sewers were built by the city of
Providence, the earth was not properly packed, and the subsequent
settling opened a leak in the gas pipes, which caused the injury com-
plained of. In an action against the Gas Company: Held, that being
in charge of a dangerous material, the Gas Company was bound both
itself to exercise due care proportioned to the risk, and also to use
similar care in preventing careless interference with its pipes by others.
The company could not prevent the construction of the sewer, but was
bound to see that the earth was properly put back; that the pipes were
properly supported, and that all needful repairs were made with reason-
able speed. Held, further, that the jury was to decide whether the
company had exercised such care. Held, further, that evidence of the
presence of gas in other green-houses connected with the same sewers
was properly admitted: Butcher v. Providence Gas Company, 12 R. I.
NEW TRIAL.
Insufficiency of Damages-Neglgence.-The court will grant a new
trial, in an action for personal injuries sustained through the defendants'
negligence, on the ground of the inadequacy of the damages found by
the jury, when it appears upon the facts proved that the jury must have
omitted to take into consideration some of the elements of damage pro-
perly involved in the plaintiff's claim: Phillips v Railway Co., L. R.,
4 Q. B. Div.
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PARTNERSHIP.
Style of-Name of Indlvidual Member-Signature to Bill of Exchange
-Liability of Firm--If the name of a partnership firm be merely the
name of an individual partner, proof that he signed such name to a bill
of exchange is not enough to make the firm liable on the bill. To
'establish the liability, the holder of the bill must further prove that the
signature was put to it by the authority and for the purposes of the firm:
Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson, L. R., 4 C. P. Div
POSSESSION. See Speciflc Performance.
POST. See Contract.
RAILROAD.
Ticket issued by One Company-Train of Another- Neglgence-
Liability of Carriers.-The defendants have running powers over the
South Western Railway between Hammersmith and the New Richmond
station of the South Western Railway Company. Above the booking
office at the New Richmond station are the words, " South Western and
Metropolitan Booking Office and District Railway." The plaintiff took
from the clerk there employed by the South Western Railway a return
ticket to Hammersmith and back. The ticket was not headed with the
name of either company, but bore on it the words "Via District Rail-
way." On his return journey from Hammersmith to Richmond the
plaintiff travelled with his ticket in a carriage of a train belonging to
the defendants and under the management of their servants. The car-
riage being unsuited for the New Richmond station platform, the plain-
tiff, on alighting there, fell and was hurt. He brought an action against
the defendants, and the jury found negligence in them. Held, that
having invited or permitted the plaintiff to travel in their train, the
defendants were bound to make reasonable provision for his safety; and
that there was evidence of their liability, even assuming the ticket not
to have been issued by or for them, but by the South Western Com-
pany: Foulkes v. Metropolitan District Railway Co., Law Rep. C. P.
Div.
RECEIVER.
Of Rents and -Profits in Foreclosure Cases.-A court. of chancery may,
where the security afforded by a mortgage is inadequate and the mort-
gagor is unable to pay the deficiency, and a foreclosure proceeding is
pending, appoint a receiver to collect the rents and profits of the mort-
gaged premises, if there are circumstances of fraud or bad faith on the
part of the mortgagor, or other facts involved which would render a
denial of the relief sought inequitable and unjust: Baas v. Chicago
Building Soc., 89 Ills.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
Navigable Stream-Meandered River-Accretions.-Where a nav-
igable river was meandered in making the public surveys, and the
United States has granted the land bounded by the meander line, the
grantee takes to the river. The stream, and not the meander line, is
the true boundary line of the riparian owner. Accretions to such land
belong to the riparian owner, and cannot be selected as swamp and
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overflowed land. An application filed in the office of the secretary of
state to purchase such accretions as swamp and overflowed lands is a'
mere nullity, and casts no cloud on the title of the riparian owner:
.into v. Delaney, S. C., Oregon.
SALE. See Husband and Wfe.
Contract, not Divisible.-The plaintiffs contracted to sell to the
defendants twenty-five tons (more or less) Penang pepper, October !--
November shipment, name of vessel or vessels, marks and particulars to
be declared within sixty days from date of bill of lading. Within the
stipulated time the plaintiffs declared twenty-five tons by a vessel called
the B., only twenty tons of which complied with the terms of the con-
tract as to shipment, and made no further declaration. The defendants
declined to accept any portion of the pepper: Held (by COTToN and
THESioER, L.JJ., BELETT, L. J., dissenting), that the contract was entire,
and that the defendants were not bound to accept the twenty tons, but
were entitled to insist upon the delivery of twenty-five tons, according
to the contract: Reuter v. Sala, L. R., 4 C. P. Div.
SALVAGE. See Admiralty.
SHERIFF.
Garnishment of MAoney Deposited by a Sheriff.-Wbere a sheriff has
moneys deposited in bank as such sheriff belonging to various execution
creditors, and the bank is garnisheed for an individual debt of the
sheriff, he may, as trustee for and on behalf of the persons for whose
use he holds such moneys interplead, showing the facts of the case,
and thereby protect the fund for those entitled to the same : Meadow.
croft v. Aynew, 89 Ills.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Parol Contract for Sale of Land-Possession.-A court of equity will
not be justified in decreeing the specific performance of a parol contract
for the sale of land, unless such contract is explicit in its terms; nor
unless the boundaries of the land are already defined. Where posses-
sion is relied on as an act of part performance of a parol contract, in
order to take the case out of the operation of the statute requiring con-
tracts in relation to the sale of lands to be in writing, such possession
must be visible, notorious and exclusive on the part of the vendee, and
must have been taken under and in pursuance of the parol agreement:
Brown v. Lord, S. C., Oregon.
STATUTE.
Intention to Govern in Interpretation of.-Statutes are sometimes
extended to cases not within the letter of them, and cases are sometimes
excluded from the operation of statutes, though within the letter, on
the principle that what is within the intention of the makers of the
statute is within the statute, though not within the letter, and that what
is not within the intention of the makers, is not within the statute, it
being an acknowledged rule in the construction of statutes that the
intention of the makers ought to be regarded: Brown v. Gates. 14
W. Va.
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City Ordinance-Effect of Repeal on Pemdin Prosecittion.-The
repeal of an ordinance pending a prosecution under it operates to
release the defendant, unless it is otherwise provided in the repealing
ordinance : City of Kansas v. White, 68 Mo.
Effect of Repeal.-The general rule is that when an act of the legis-
lature is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except
as to transactions passed and closed, as if it had never existed : (Curran
v. Owens, 14 W. Va.
A right of action which does not exist at common law but depends
solely upon statute, falls with the repeal of the statute without a saving
clause or a general law saving pending suits, unless that right has been
carried into judgment : Id.
Whether the legislature, by its Repealing Act, intended to affect
suits pending, in the absence of a general law upon the subject, must
be gathered from the.Rtepealing Act itself: IN.
If the Repealing Act does not substantially re-enact a section of the
law repealed which gave the right of action, and there is no saving
clause as to pending suits, and no general law on the subject, the legis-
lative intent is clear that all suits brought upon the repealed act fall
unless carried into judgment: Id.
But if the section in the old act which gave the right of action is
substantially re-enacted in the repealing statute, so that there is no
moment of time when the repealed section was not the law, although no
reservation is made as to pending suits, the re-enacted section continues
in uninterrupted operation, and suits brought thereon are saved, but
otherwise, as in this case, if not substantially re-enacted: Md.
SURETY.
Misrepresentation of Facts to.-When, with the knowledge and
assent of the creditor, there is a misrepresentation with regard to
material facts, and had the real facts been known and not misstated,
they might reasonably have prevented the security from entering into
his contract of suretyship, such contract will not be binding on the
surety, though such misrepresentation was not made with a fraudulent
purpose: Warren v. Branch, 14 W. Va.
Unless inquired of by a surety, a creditor is under no obligation to
disclose facts in no manner connected with the business which is the
subject of the suretyship, though such facts would probably have &
decided influence on the surety in determining whether he would enter
into the contract, but if a material fact connected with the contract of
suretyship which might influence the surety in entering into the con-
tract, isfraudulently concealed with a view to benefit the creditor, such
concealment, though no inquiry is made by the surety, would discharge
him: Id.
But though the simple failure of a creditor to communicate to a
surety a fact material for the surety to know, and though this fact be
connected with the contract of suretyship, will not generally vitiate the
contract unless the concealment by the creditor was fraudulent even
though the principal in procuring the security to enter into the contract
acted fraudulently, yet if the dealings are such as fairly to lead the cred-
itor, if a reisonable man, to believe that the principal must have used
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fraud by suppressing facts or otherwise, in procuring the surety to enter
into the contract, and such fraud has been used, it will vitiate the
contract as to the surety though no act of fraud be traced to the cred-
itor: Id.
TAXATION.
When Enjoin ed.-A court of chancery has jurisdiction to enjoin the
collection of a tax, and will exercise it in all cases where the tax has
been levied without authority of law, or where the property is not sub-
ject to taxation: .Kimball v. Merchants' Savings Loan and Trust Co.,
89 Ills.
TENDER.
Bringing Money into Court.-A. party who, in a court of equity or
law, relies on a tender of money in satisfaction of a debt, must bring
into court when he files his pleading setting up such tender, the amount
of money so tendered, unless this production of the money is waived by
the other side. And if he fails to do so, this defence to the payment
of the debt and any proof in relation thereto will be disregarded by the
court: Gilkeson v. Smith, 14 W. Va.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Resulting Trust-Parent and C7hld.-Where a father purchases a
tract of land in the name of a son, and in the written contract the
vendor is required, upon the payment of the purchase-money, to con-
vey the land to the son, and the father pays the purchase-money, the
son can, in a court of equity, compel the vendor to convey the land to
him, there being in such case no resulting trust in the father: Lorentz
v. Lorentz, Ex'r, 14 W. Va.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Action.
Lien of Vendor.--A married woman bought certain realty of K.,
and in part payment gave her sole note secured by her sole mortgage.
The note not being paid and the record title to the realty remaining in
her nanie unencumbered, K. filed a bill in equity against her and her
husband to establish his vendor's lien for the purchase-money on the
realty in question. Held, that he was entitled to the relief claimed:
Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I.
VTERDICT.
Juror-Impeachment of Verdict.-A juror will not be allowed to im-
peach his verdict by his affidavit that he would not have found'the
defendant guilty, if he had known that the punishment fixed by law for
the crime charged was death: The State v. Shock, 68 Mo.
WILL.
Undue Influene.-When a will is shown to have been duly executed,
the law presumes compctincy in the testator, and that it contains his
unconstrained wishes in regard to distribution of his property, but this
presumption may be rebutted by showing that it was obtained by fraud
and undue influence: Greenwood v. Cline, S. C., Oregon.
What constitutes undue influence is one of those inquiries which, in
its nature, cannot be referred to any general rule, but depends upon the
circumstances of each case: Id.
